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Abstract As healthcare spending in the United States
continues to rise at an unsustainable rate, recent policy
decisions introduced at the national level will rely on pre-
cepts of evidence-based medicine to promote the determi-
nation, dissemination, and delivery of “best practices” or
quality care while simultaneously reducing cost. We dis-
cuss the inXuence of evidence-based medicine on policy
and, in turn, the impact of policy on the developing clinical
evidence base with an eye to the potential eVects of these
relationships on the practice and provision of urologic care.
Keywords Policy · Evidence-based medicine · Urology · 
Pay-for-performance · Accountable care organizations · 
Medical home
Introduction
On March 23, 2010, the Patient Protection and AVordable
Care Act (PPACA) was signed into law, heralding monu-
mental changes in access to the US health care system. Due
to unsustainable growth in Federal spending, with unfunded
liability for Medicare alone estimated at $36.4 trillion, vari-
ous policy experiments were introduced under the legisla-
tion in an attempt to “bend the cost curve” [1]. These
experiments have several elements in common. They
assume there is widespread provision of healthcare services
that are not based on evidence, do not improve human
health, and which, if eliminated, would reduce health care
costs. They assume timely provision of appropriate
evidence-based care will not only improve quality, but lower
overall spending. They anticipate widespread physician
adoption of information technology such as electronic health
records. They also assume physicians, hospitals, and insur-
ance companies will be able to create new care delivery
mechanisms and Wnd ways to equitably distribute global
payment (“gainsharing”). While these assumptions will
soon be tested, the policy interventions they motivate are
based on decades of published literature regarding the evi-
dence basis of medicine delivered in the United States.
Surprisingly, the notion of evidence-based clinical
practice as an explicit standard, itself, is a contemporary
phenomenon. Coined by Eddy in 1990, the term “evidence-
based” was used to highlight the absence of scientiWc data
to support many then-common medical practices that were
simply assumed to be eVective [2]. As he later described, a
major problem that had developed was that “coverage and
medical necessity were deWned tautologically; if the major-
ity of physicians were doing it, it was medically necessary
and should be covered” [3]. Supporting this observation
was Wennberg’s seminal study demonstrating that common
surgical procedures such as tonsillectomy or open prosta-
tectomy were performed at widely diVering rates in Ver-
mont compared with New Hampshire [3]. As there was no
reason to believe the population of either state had diVering
indications for such procedures, Wennberg concluded that
this “practice pattern variation” was due to physician
assumptions about treatment eYcacy that were not based
on a common standard of evidence. Thus began a new era
in the history of medicine in which clinical practice became
the subject of critical inquiry, with subsequent reports cor-
roborating widespread geographic variation in care and out-
lying, aberrant practices that contradicted contemporary
society guideline recommendations [4–8].
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tions born out of the push for evidence-based medicine
(EBM) that may aVect the practice and delivery of urologic
care.
Guidelines
Over the past decades, the advancement of methods such as
meta-analysis and cost-eVectiveness analysis to critically
examine treatments and practices helped reveal that many
medical “standards of care” were based not on evidence of
eYcacy, but on consensus or regional opinion [3]. Both pri-
vate and public sector payers viewed mounting healthcare
costs with growing alarm and struggled with processes to
determine what services should be covered. The health pol-
icy response to these inXuences has been to introduce scien-
tiWc rigor and standardized processes to the way in which
organized medicine deWnes good clinical practice.
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, multiple professional
medical organizations, including the American Urological
Association (AUA), pioneered guideline development
processes and methodologies that are still in use today
[3, 9, 10]. The AUA Practice Guidelines Committee
approaches urologic issues with the imperative of evaluating
existing recommendations every 2–3 years using cost-eVective
methods that fulWll Institute of Medicine criteria for pro-
ducing evidence-based guidelines [11]. Focusing on topics
that are “prevalent, costly, and are characterized by signiW-
cant practice variation,” the Committee’s procedure relies
on systematic reviews as the foundation for its recommen-
dations, with the summarization and synthesis of data
through qualitative or quantitative means, the assessment of
level of recommendation (LoR) and level of evidence
(LoE), and the explicit linkage of LoR to LoE [11].
Evidence of adherence to guideline recommendations in
many areas of medicine is disheartening. Insofar as “best
practices” are reXected in quality—deWned by the IOM as
“the degree to which health services for individuals and
populations increase the likelihood of desired health
outcomes and are consistent with current professional
knowledge” [12]—one study examining guideline-based
processes of care (e.g., prophylactic antibiosis on day of
surgery) suggest that Americans across the nation are sub-
ject to poor quality: only 55% of recommended care was
received [8]. Within urology, studies are mixed regarding
quality of care and data are limited on whether guidelines
increase evidence-based practice. A longitudinally per-
formed Gallup survey of practicing urologists suggested
that use of computed tomography and bone scans in
patients with prostate cancer had signiWcantly decreased
after publication of the 1996 AUA Prostate Cancer Guide-
lines Panel, suggesting practices could be changed with
introduction of society recommendations [13]. However, in
a later examination of a large Medicare cohort, imaging
studies performed for patients with clinically localized
prostate cancer varied considerably not only based on geo-
graphic region but also by primary treatment (radiotherapy
versus prostatectomy), intimating that guideline recommen-
dations were not broadly accepted [14].
Such contradiction has been observed in studies of blad-
der cancer treatment as well. In one investigation, most sur-
veyed urologists’ practice patterns were in keeping with
contemporary AUA guidelines, but certain recommenda-
tions, such as cystectomy following two-time failure of
intravesical chemotherapy for high-grade Ta-T1 disease,
were not [15]. Analyses of Surveillance Epidemiology and
End Results (SEER)/Medicare data also suggest extreme
performance variation in recommended therapeutic modali-
ties such as mitomycin C after transurethral resection of
bladder tumor, suggesting that guidelines have limited
impact [16, 17]. The inXuence of patient preference on ful-
Wllment of recommended therapy has not been well studied,
however, and may certainly have an impact. It is also true
that many diseases are too rare or care is too diYcult to
measure to create evidence-based guidelines.
While its potential for greater consistency in care pro-
vision with streamlined dissemination of “best” medical
knowledge is yet to be entirely fulWlled, the modern
guideline has at least become a pivotal component not
only in the impetus for EBM, but the appraisal of its
performance.
Pay-for-performance programs
If a best clinical practice can be deWned, that practice in
theory can and should be measured—a possibility more
recently encountered with development of quality measures
and “pay-for-performance” (P4P) reimbursement schemas.
A logical extension of EBM to policy, P4P programs
endorse speciWc quality indicators and directly link perfor-
mance on them to physician and hospital reimbursement.
Well-designed P4P programs promise to be potent drivers
of change in the way healthcare is delivered, and indeed,
they are proliferating—multiple health care settings from
around the world have reported their use, as well as over
half of all health maintenance organizations in the United
States [18, 19]. Results of P4P programs on quality in pri-
mary care and other non-urologic settings are conXicting.
Though the durability and clinical signiWcance of P4P on
quality improvement have been questioned [20, 21], a
recent systematic review found that a majority of studies
did show positive eVects on quality [22]; the number show-
ing minimal to no eVect, in essence, emphasizes the impor-
tance of proper program design.123
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require careful balance of several key factors. These include
selection of appropriate, transparent, and high-impact mea-
sures and correct design of incentives. Measurement and
payment can be structured on the level of the individual, the
group, or a combination, but the rewarded or penalized
party must have the ability to inXuence the metric being
evaluated [19]. For example, holding the urologist account-
able for administration of pre-operative antibiotics within
30 min of incision assumes s/he has direct control over
nursing and anesthesia practices, which is often not the
case. The reward amount must also be meaningful to the
rewarded party for any incentive to be eVective [19]. For
instance, when a practice carries multiple insurers with only
a few patients in each, incentives from any one plan may
not rise to a level of value to the provider. In a study of P4P
programs in California, physician organizations noted that
bonuses received in one year were only ·2% of total capi-
tation [23]. Medicare’s P4P program, the Physician Quality
Reporting Initiative (PQRI), has had challenges reporting
information to participating physicians regarding perfor-
mance and reasons for varying levels of reimbursement
after participation, which may blunt its ability to incentivize
physicians.
Payment can reward absolute goals or a certain rate of
improvement from baseline. Such designs can result in pro-
grams that improve poorly performing outliers or favor pro-
viders in organizations with established continuous quality
improvement infrastructure. It is argued that P4P programs
can also be designed to improve not only quality of care,
but access to care among underserved populations [19].
In urology, the AUA partnered with the American Medi-
cal Association Physician Consortium for Performance
Improvement® to create prostate cancer quality of care
measures for the PQRI program using a deWned, multi-
stakeholder process. These measures mainly examine pro-
cesses of care [24, 25]. Though reporting on care outcomes
would intuitively seem most relevant to surgeons, such
measures require risk-adjustment which is not feasible
under the current, claims-based PQRI regime. Measure-
ment depends on voluntary physician reporting with newly
designed CPT II codes that record, for instance, documen-
tation of pre-treatment prostate-speciWc antigen level, Glea-
son score, and tumor stage. At this point, whether reporting
of these indicators will lead to improvement in the pro-
cesses of care they purport to measure is unknown, as is
any possible impact on patient outcomes. P4P measures
speciWc to urology have been developed and utilized in
some private insurance networks, often by insurers them-
selves in an opaque process, and several reports have sug-
gested other urologic disease processes where P4P
programs could be implemented, including benign prostatic
hypertrophy (BPH) and bladder cancer [26, 27].
Comparative eVectiveness research
Healthcare expenditures have risen continuously to reach
17.3% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2010 and are
expected to reach 19.3% by 2019 [28]. In response, some
policy advisors have called for explicit consideration of cost
with evaluation of appropriateness and coverage of services
[29], while others have vociferously objected to any evalua-
tion of cost whatsoever. In 1989, for example, Medicare
administrators proposed employing cost-eVectiveness analy-
sis—or the comparison of “the relative value of diVerent
interventions in creating better health and/or longer life”
[30]—as a basis for tying reimbursement decisions to data
or evidence. This was quashed in no small part due to
concerns about “rationing” and deep American distrust
for organizational, versus individual, decision-making
[31].
Two recessions later, as healthcare costs continue to
consume an ever-larger portion of the nation’s economic
pie, policymakers have discovered the political will to
embrace a close cousin of cost-eVectiveness research, com-
parative eVectiveness research (CER). CER proposes to
examine how treatments perform against each other in
achieving clinical objectives, without explicit assessment of
costs. At the Federal level, CER has been posited as a major
way forward: building on the Medicare Modernization Act
of 2003, in which approximately $15 million was allocated
to CER [31], the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
of 2009 dedicated another $1.1 billion (by comparison, the
entire NIH budget in 2010 was $31 billion dollars [32]) to
“research that compares the clinical outcomes, eVective-
ness, and appropriateness of items, services, and procedures
that are used to prevent, diagnose, or treat diseases, disor-
ders, and other health conditions” [33]. Additionally, a
regular funding mechanism for CER was introduced in the
PPACA with the creation of the Patient-Centered Out-
comes Research Institute (PCORI) with an estimated
annual budget of $500 million dollars coming from a new
tax on Medicare and private payers [34]. In light of this
Federal enthusiasm, CER is poised to aVect clinical prac-
tice, for although it does not include cost-cutting as an overt
objective, its proponents suggest that cost containment
would be a secondary beneWt through the elimination of
ineVective or inappropriate care [35].
Despite persistent opponent concern for “rationing,”
supporters of CER cite what Gold et al. have articulated as
the “two realities” that “provide compelling context to
health policy decisions”: “the availability of health-related
interventions now in the marketplace exceeds by a consid-
erable margin our societal ability to aVord them, and cur-
rent decision rules are inadequate to guide choices toward
those interventions that are likely to yield the most beneWt
for the population” [30]. To this end, the IOM has deWned123
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interventions, the study of patients in typical day-to-day
clinical care, and the aim of tailoring decisions to the needs
of individual patients”—and identiWed 100 top priorities for
it [36]. Roughly half of these CER priorities pertain to
health care delivery, a third to disparities, a Wfth to func-
tional limitation/disability, followed by cardiovascular/
peripheral vascular disease, psychiatric disorders, and can-
cer as the successive most frequent emphases [37]. Four-
teen topics pertain to urology, four of which appear in the
highest quartile of importance, including the goals of “com-
par[ing] the eVectiveness of management strategies for
localized prostate cancer,” the eVectiveness of imaging and
biomarkers in patients with cancer, and comparison of
methods to reduce health disparities [36]. According to the
IOM, CER primarily includes systematic reviews, observa-
tional studies, and randomized controlled trials [38]. Many
studies in urology have been performed that qualify as
CER, with comparisons ranging from robotically assisted
versus open methods of radical prostatectomy to surgeon
hand-scrubbing versus application of sterilizing gel among
pediatric urologists [39, 40].
Much of CER, to date, has been conducted outside of the
surgical literature, most importantly in the application of
evidence-based medicine to the evaluation of how health
care delivery, or the structure of medical practice, aVects
outcome. The promise of CER is that it may bolster the evi-
dence behind medical practices that improve health and
reduce cost at the expense of ineYciency (rather than
access to care). In addition to CER, policymakers and
stakeholders have promoted two innovations in care coordi-
nation as methods by which eVective medical practices
could be most eYciently delivered: accountable care orga-
nizations and the medical home.
Accountable care organizations
Accountable care organizations (ACOs) have gained sig-
niWcant interest among healthcare policy leaders, driven in
large part by the success of many prominent healthcare sys-
tems that utilize ACO principles: the Mayo Clinic, Cleve-
land Clinic, the Permanente Medical Group, as well as
smaller operations like Bassett Healthcare in New York and
the Billings Clinic in Montana, among others [41]. While the
Federal deWnition of an ACO is still a work-in-progress, the
central tenet is shared responsibility between coordinated
groups of providers to deliver high-quality care for medical
conditions at predetermined cost targets.
The PPACA deWnes ACOs as networks of physicians,
large physician groups, hospital-physician partnerships,
hospitals employing physicians, and any other arrangement
that the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS)
“determines appropriate” [42]. ACOs must enter three-year
contracts, have certain legal and administrative attributes,
have at least 5,000 patients, and “deWne processes to pro-
mote evidence-based medicine and patient engagement,
[and] report on quality and cost measures” [42]. Though
payment structure is through Medicare Parts A and B,
ACOs share some percentage of cost-savings derived from
meeting quality and cost-containment criteria. The cost-
containment assessment is based on average per capita
spending adjusted for patient characteristics being less than
a certain percentage below an “applicable benchmark”
speciWed by the Secretary of HHS [42]. ACOs should thus
be motivated to deliver healthcare “value,” deWned by high-
quality/low cost, as they participate in gainsharing and their
activities are proWled using quality metrics.
ACO proponents hope that the promise of extra reim-
bursement will overcome historical hurdles that physicians
and hospitals have faced in working toward joint objec-
tives. For example, a group of urologists might form an
ACO with other specialists, a core of primary care physi-
cians (PCP), and a hospital to deliver coordinated care
across a spectrum of diseases such as benign prostatic
hypertrophy (BPH) or urinary calculi. The group would
then be held accountable for the cost and quality of all
aspects of care, from diagnosis to early medical manage-
ment, surgical management, and prevention of recurrence.
The ACO would need to deWne how to distribute the capi-
tated reimbursement or gainsharing amount between ACO
participants and how to organize to provide appropriate
rates of surgical and medical care without providing inap-
propriate or wasteful care that would inXate its cost struc-
ture [43]. This hypothetical arrangement is but one of many
possible ACO arrangements; the intent of the law is to
inspire a wide variety of delivery models [41].
The Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC)
has recommended promoting care delivery in this model
for several years [44–46]. In 2005, CMS introduced the
Physician Group Practice Demonstration to test the imple-
mentation of ACOs. A Medicare report at year three indi-
cates success at improving quality and reducing costs
[43]. However, one report of 15 centers participating in a
randomized trial of enhanced care coordination versus
standard of care found no diVerence in patient outcomes in
thirteen of Wfteen centers [47].
Critical regulatory details of ACOs are still unclear. Fore-
most among these is patient attribution—that is, deWning
exactly which patients are considered part of an ACO and
which of their care episodes count against the ACO contract
or toward potential savings. Such can be challenging to
deWne, especially when patients may not get all of their care
from an ACO (as, by law, they are not required to do).
Although the fundamental idea of large provider groups
being accountable to eYciency and quality has existed for123
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[48], questions have been raised about the ability of ACOs
to reduce costs when viewed from the perspective of the
healthcare system as a whole. One examination of the pri-
vate-payer healthcare market in California concluded that
while ACOs might decrease costs for Medicare, they have a
potential to increase costs for private insurers [49]. The
authors contend that the increasing number of “ACO-like”
healthcare groups and organizations, including consoli-
dated hospital chains and large multi-specialty groups, has
led directly to double-digit increases in hospital charges
from 1999 to 2005 through improved bargaining power
with private payers. Encouraging the formation of more
ACOs may foster further provider consolidation in local
healthcare markets, increasing their bargaining power with
payers.
Again, ACOs remain experimental, as does the role for
specialist care within them, though a prominent model is
the salaried physician in a large multispecialty clinic or
practice. The trend toward large group practices in urology
may position them well to coordinate with other physician
groups or hospitals. Areas where urologists already partici-
pate in coordinated multidisciplinary care are oncology and
renal transplant [50, 51]. These groups and the lessons
learned from their experiences may be germinal to broader
organizational connectivity and accountability.
Medical home
Advanced in 1967 by the American Academy of Pediatrics,
the concept of the “medical home” was developed in
response to the consequences of multiple providers relying
on fragmented health records to provide care for children
with special health needs: “for children with chronic dis-
eases or disabling conditions, the lack of a complete record
and a ‘medical home’ is a major deterrent to adequate
health supervision” [52]. Over 30 years later, the same
could still be said to hold true not only for children but also
for adults. Given the related problems of increased cost,
poor-quality care (including duplication of or gaps in ser-
vices), and poor health outcomes, this decades-old proposal
has been resurrected as one of the “patient-centered” deliv-
ery innovations, called for by the IOM [12]. This concept
promotes four major characteristics in primary care:
“accessibility for Wrst-contact care for each new problem or
health need, long-term person-focused care (“longitudi-
nally”), comprehensiveness of care in the sense that care is
provided for all health needs except those that are too
uncommon for the primary care practitioner to maintain
competence in dealing with them, and coordination of care
in instances in which patients do have to go elsewhere”
[53].
Ample data have demonstrated the beneWts of accessi-
ble, continuous, comprehensive, and coordinated care (with
some arguing that family-oriented, community-oriented,
and culturally competent care follows suit as a result) [53].
While international comparisons have shown the correla-
tion of strong primary care systems with decreased rates of
low birth weight, infant mortality, and child mortality,
improved health outcomes have been seen domestically as
well when a usual source of care can be identiWed. Earlier
diagnosis of problems, better performance of preventive
processes of care, fewer hospitalizations, fewer emergency
room visits, and decreased expenditures have been associ-
ated with features of the medical home [53]. Additionally,
decreases in health care disparities by race/ethnicity [54]
and overall mortality [55] have been associated with this
care delivery model. Patient-centered systems have also
been shown to result in increased levels of patient satisfac-
tion [56, 57].
Recent incarnations of the patient-centered medical
home (PCMH) emphasize a more systems-savvy approach
in which organizational access increases provider-patient
communication, information technology improves medical
record-keeping and safety, and team-based models deliver
eVective, eYcient, evidence-based care [58]. As such, reli-
ance shifts from the primary care provider (PCP) in isola-
tion to the PCP and other health professionals (such as
nurses, social workers, dieticians, physical therapists, phar-
macists) in the context of a team that “forms and reforms
according to patient needs” and takes “collective responsi-
bility” of patient care, thereby enhancing quality while
potentially decreasing resource utilization [54]. Proponents
of the medical home place the PCP at its core with the
belief that those physicians are best equipped to deliver
value to the healthcare system. A seminal investigation
from the Medical Outcomes Study examined records of
over 20,000 patients and found that specialists providing
care outside their Weld of expertise tended to generate more
tests and referrals than generalists [59].
With current policy trends, including the PPACA, the
PCMH will likely be favored as a model of care delivery,
particularly as health care access grows, aVecting specialist
practice in several ways [49]. Because the PCMH could
also be delivered via a specialty practice (e.g., endocrinology
for a complicated diabetic or oncology for a patient with
cancer), not only will specialists need to know how to
engage with the patient in the context of the primary care-
based PCMH but, if interested, would need to learn how to
function as the “hub” of care as well [60]. The structural
and systems-level implications for being the PCMH may,
thus, be diVerent depending on the current state of the spe-
cialist practice. Though many urologists participate in mul-
tidisciplinary care, the patient-centered model may require
more intensive access, coordination, comprehensive care,123
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common non-oncologic processes such as stone disease and
BPH. The timely tracking and forwarding of patient informa-
tion to relevant providers may prove one of the most challeng-
ing of these requirements within the PCMH model, in
addition to tracking data for quality assurance and monitoring.
Certainly, the renewed emphasis on earlier MedPAC
recommendations for accountable provider groups
increases the motivation for improving communication and
coordination between collectively responsible providers
[44–46]. Though the operational details of collective
accountability are, by policy, left to be determined by the
providers (physicians, hospitals, insurers), the mandate
from the PPACA is clear, and the pooled accountability
will no doubt impact specialist reimbursement and practice.
The challenge for independent practitioners may be
immense. Additionally, some have expressed concern that
the PCMH, as Wrst-contact provider, may signiWcantly
reduce referrals to specialists; however, the PCMH as pro-
posed is not designed to function as a “gatekeeper” that
limits referrals but, rather, is an entity that promotes appro-
priate referrals. As such, reimbursement or payment under
the PCMH is expected to come from cost-savings incurred
from better patient-centered care, including not only
decreased inappropriate referrals to specialists, but
increased preventive services, decreased emergency visits,
and decreased hospitalization rates [60].
Conclusion
The US healthcare system’s lack of central control creates, in
essence, a large laboratory for ways to deliver high-quality,
evidence-based care. With the PPACA, a large stimulus has
been provided to experiment and drive innovation in health-
care delivery. Despite this promise, the US system fails far
too many people in terms of access to and quality of care.
The opportunity for urologists—and their responsibility as
the ultimate advocates for their patients—is to take a leading
role in shaping the future of healthcare delivery so that it is
better for the patient and hospitable for the physician.
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